Adverse Selection And Health Insurance

Adverse Selection and Health Insurance: A Deep Dive into the Risks

Introduction:

The health insurance market, while vital for societal well-being, faces a significant challenge: adverse selection. This phenomenon, where individuals with higher risks are more likely to purchase insurance than those with lower risks, can destabilize the entire system. This article will dissect adverse selection in the context of health insurance, exploring its causes, consequences, and the strategies insurers employ to mitigate its effects. We'll delve into the economic principles at play, examine real-world examples, and discuss potential solutions to ensure a sustainable and equitable health insurance market. Prepare to gain a comprehensive understanding of this critical issue affecting millions worldwide.


1. Understanding Adverse Selection: The Core Concept

Adverse selection isn't simply about "bad" selections; it's about asymmetric information. Insurers possess limited knowledge about the health status of potential policyholders. Individuals, however, have a far better understanding of their own health risks – pre-existing conditions, family history, lifestyle choices, etc. This information asymmetry allows individuals with higher health risks (higher likelihood of needing expensive medical care) to disproportionately seek insurance, while healthier individuals may opt out, finding the premiums too costly for the relatively low perceived benefit. This skews the risk pool, making it less profitable for insurers and potentially leading to higher premiums for everyone.

2. The Mechanics of Adverse Selection in Health Insurance

Imagine a simplified scenario: two groups of people – one healthy, one unhealthy. If both groups pay the same premium for health insurance, the unhealthy group will overwhelmingly opt for coverage. The insurer, unaware of the true risk distribution, sets premiums based on an average risk. However, the actual claims from the unhealthy group far exceed the premiums collected, leading to financial losses for the insurer. This forces the insurer to increase premiums for everyone to compensate for the losses, which in turn drives more healthy individuals out of the market, further exacerbating the problem. This cyclical effect is the essence of adverse selection’s destructive power.

3. Consequences of Unmitigated Adverse Selection

The consequences of unchecked adverse selection are severe:

Higher Premiums: As the risk pool becomes increasingly skewed towards higher-risk individuals, premiums must rise to cover the increased claims. This can make health insurance unaffordable for many, particularly those who are healthy but need coverage.
Market Instability: Insurers may find it increasingly unprofitable to offer health insurance, potentially leading to market exit or a reduction in coverage options. This limits consumer choice and can leave many without access to vital healthcare.
Reduced Efficiency: Resources are diverted to covering high-cost claims, rather than focusing on preventive care and proactive health management. This diminishes the overall efficiency of the healthcare system.
Increased Inequality: Those who can afford higher premiums will still have access to coverage, while lower-income individuals and those with pre-existing conditions may be left vulnerable.

4. Strategies to Mitigate Adverse Selection

Insurers employ various strategies to mitigate the effects of adverse selection:

Risk Assessment and Underwriting: Thorough medical history reviews, lifestyle assessments, and sometimes even genetic testing are used to assess risk and tailor premiums accordingly. This is a controversial approach, often criticized for potential discrimination against certain groups.
Risk Pooling: Expanding the pool of insured individuals can dilute the impact of high-risk individuals. Mandated health insurance programs, such as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the United States, aim to achieve this by requiring most citizens to obtain coverage.
Premium Adjustments: Insurers can adjust premiums based on factors like age, location, smoking status, and pre-existing conditions. This aims to reflect the true risk associated with each individual, but it can lead to higher premiums for high-risk individuals.
Preventative Care Incentives: Encouraging preventative health measures can reduce the overall number of claims, making the risk pool healthier and more sustainable. This can involve offering discounts for health screenings and wellness programs.
Data Analytics and Predictive Modeling: Advanced data analytics and machine learning techniques can help insurers better predict future claims, improving the accuracy of risk assessment and premium setting.

5. The Role of Government Regulation

Government intervention plays a crucial role in addressing adverse selection. Regulations, such as mandated participation (as seen in the ACA), help create a larger and more diversified risk pool, reducing the impact of adverse selection. However, the balance between ensuring affordability and preventing market distortions requires careful consideration. Overly stringent regulations can stifle competition and innovation within the insurance industry.


Article Outline: Adverse Selection and Health Insurance

I. Introduction

Hook: Briefly discuss the high cost of healthcare and the challenges faced by insurance companies.
Overview: Define adverse selection and its relevance to health insurance.
Thesis Statement: Explain that adverse selection poses significant risks to the health insurance market's stability and affordability.

II. Understanding Adverse Selection

Asymmetric Information: Explain the core concept of unequal information between insurers and policyholders.
Examples: Illustrate with real-world scenarios showing how adverse selection works.
Consequences: Detail the potential negative outcomes, including higher premiums, reduced coverage options, and market instability.

III. Mitigating Adverse Selection

Strategies used by insurance companies: Detail risk assessment, underwriting, and premium adjustments.
Government regulations: Discuss the role of mandates and other interventions.
Technological solutions: Briefly mention data analytics and predictive modeling.

IV. Conclusion

Recap of key points: Summarize the main challenges and mitigation strategies.
Future outlook: Discuss ongoing debates and potential solutions.
Call to action: Encourage readers to learn more and engage in informed discussions.


(The content above already provides a detailed explanation fulfilling the outline.)


FAQs:

1. What is the difference between adverse selection and moral hazard in health insurance? Adverse selection deals with the pre-existing conditions and hidden information before insurance is purchased, while moral hazard refers to changes in behavior after insurance is acquired (e.g., increased risk-taking due to coverage).

2. How does the Affordable Care Act (ACA) address adverse selection? The ACA addresses adverse selection through mandated participation, requiring most individuals to obtain health insurance. This expands the risk pool, diluting the impact of high-risk individuals.

3. Can adverse selection lead to a complete collapse of the health insurance market? While unlikely in its entirety, severe adverse selection can lead to market instability, reduced coverage options, and significantly increased premiums, making health insurance inaccessible to many.

4. How do insurers use data analytics to mitigate adverse selection? Data analytics helps insurers better predict risks, identify patterns in claims, and tailor premiums more accurately based on individual risk profiles.

5. Is risk-based pricing ethical? This is a complex ethical question. While risk-based pricing is a tool to mitigate adverse selection, it can lead to concerns about fairness and equity, potentially leaving vulnerable populations with limited access to affordable care.

6. What is the role of preventative care in mitigating adverse selection? Preventative care can reduce the overall number of claims, resulting in a healthier risk pool and potentially lower premiums for everyone.

7. How can consumers protect themselves from the effects of adverse selection? Maintaining good health, actively disclosing relevant health information, and comparing insurance plans thoroughly are essential.

8. Are there any alternative models to the traditional insurance system that could better address adverse selection? Several alternative models are being explored, including single-payer systems and various forms of social health insurance, but each has its own set of challenges and complexities.

9. What is the future of health insurance in the face of adverse selection? The future likely involves a combination of advanced analytics, government regulation, and innovative insurance models to balance affordability, accessibility, and market sustainability.


Related Articles:

1. The Economics of Health Insurance: An overview of the economic principles underlying health insurance markets.
2. Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Explores the concept of moral hazard and its impact on healthcare costs.
3. The Affordable Care Act and Its Impact on Health Insurance: A detailed analysis of the ACA's successes and challenges.
4. Health Insurance Market Competition and Consumer Choice: Examines the role of competition in shaping the health insurance landscape.
5. Predictive Analytics in Health Insurance: Focuses on the use of data-driven techniques in risk assessment and prevention.
6. The Ethics of Risk-Based Pricing in Health Insurance: A discussion on the ethical dilemmas surrounding differentiated premiums.
7. Global Health Insurance Systems: A Comparative Analysis: A comparison of various health insurance models worldwide.
8. The Role of Technology in Improving Healthcare Access and Affordability: Explores how technology can address challenges in healthcare access.
9. The Future of Healthcare: Trends and Predictions: Looks at potential future trends shaping the healthcare landscape.


  adverse selection and health insurance: How Adverse Selection Affects the Health Insurance Market Paolo Belli, 2001 There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Loss Coverage Guy Thomas, 2017-05-11 A novel book that argues that, contrary to received wisdom, some adverse selection in insurance markets is beneficial to society as a whole. It is for all those interested in public policy arguments about insurance and discrimination: policymakers, academics, actuaries, underwriters, disability activists, geneticists and other medical professionals.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Amy Finkelstein, 2014-12-02 Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
  adverse selection and health insurance: Frontiers in Health Policy Research David M. Cutler, Alan M. Garber, 2004 Leading economists discuss current health policy challenges, including prescription drugs benefits as a component of Medicare and conversion to for-profit health plans.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Employment and Health Benefits Institute of Medicine, Committee on Employment-Based Health Benefits, 1993-02-01 The United States is unique among economically advanced nations in its reliance on employers to provide health benefits voluntarily for workers and their families. Although it is well known that this system fails to reach millions of these individuals as well as others who have no connection to the work place, the system has other weaknesses. It also has many advantages. Because most proposals for health care reform assume some continued role for employers, this book makes an important contribution by describing the strength and limitations of the current system of employment-based health benefits. It provides the data and analysis needed to understand the historical, social, and economic dynamics that have shaped present-day arrangements and outlines what might be done to overcome some of the access, value, and equity problems associated with current employer, insurer, and government policies and practices. Health insurance terminology is often perplexing, and this volume defines essential concepts clearly and carefully. Using an array of primary sources, it provides a store of information on who is covered for what services at what costs, on how programs vary by employer size and industry, and on what governments doâ€and do not doâ€to oversee employment-based health programs. A case study adapted from real organizations' experiences illustrates some of the practical challenges in designing, managing, and revising benefit programs. The sometimes unintended and unwanted consequences of employer practices for workers and health care providers are explored. Understanding the concepts of risk, biased risk selection, and risk segmentation is fundamental to sound health care reform. This volume thoroughly examines these key concepts and how they complicate efforts to achieve efficiency and equity in health coverage and health care. With health care reform at the forefront of public attention, this volume will be important to policymakers and regulators, employee benefit managers and other executives, trade associations, and decisionmakers in the health insurance industry, as well as analysts, researchers, and students of health policy.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Care Without Coverage Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Care Services, Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, 2002-06-20 Many Americans believe that people who lack health insurance somehow get the care they really need. Care Without Coverage examines the real consequences for adults who lack health insurance. The study presents findings in the areas of prevention and screening, cancer, chronic illness, hospital-based care, and general health status. The committee looked at the consequences of being uninsured for people suffering from cancer, diabetes, HIV infection and AIDS, heart and kidney disease, mental illness, traumatic injuries, and heart attacks. It focused on the roughly 30 million-one in seven-working-age Americans without health insurance. This group does not include the population over 65 that is covered by Medicare or the nearly 10 million children who are uninsured in this country. The main findings of the report are that working-age Americans without health insurance are more likely to receive too little medical care and receive it too late; be sicker and die sooner; and receive poorer care when they are in the hospital, even for acute situations like a motor vehicle crash.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Encyclopedia of Gerontology and Population Aging Danan Gu, Matthew E. Dupre, 2021-11-03 This eight-volume encyclopedia brings together a comprehensive collection of work highlighting established research and emerging science in all relevant disciplines in gerontology and population aging. It covers the breadth of the field, gives readers access to all major sub-fields, and illustrates their interconnectedness with other disciplines. With more than 1300 cross-disciplinary contributors—including anthropologists, biologists, economists, psychiatrists, public policy experts, sociologists, and others—the encyclopedia delves deep into key areas of gerontology and population aging such as ageism, biodemography, disablement, longevity, long-term care, and much more. Paying careful attention to empirical research and literature from around the globe, the encyclopedia is of interest to a wide audience that includes researchers, teachers and students, policy makers, (non)governmental agencies, public health practitioners, business planners, and many other individuals and organizations.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Health-Care Utilization as a Proxy in Disability Determination National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Health and Medicine Division, Board on Health Care Services, Committee on Health Care Utilization and Adults with Disabilities, 2018-04-02 The Social Security Administration (SSA) administers two programs that provide benefits based on disability: the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. This report analyzes health care utilizations as they relate to impairment severity and SSA's definition of disability. Health Care Utilization as a Proxy in Disability Determination identifies types of utilizations that might be good proxies for listing-level severity; that is, what represents an impairment, or combination of impairments, that are severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity, regardless of age, education, or work experience.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Adverse Selection in Health Insurance David M. Cutler, Richard Zeckhauser, 1997 Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses, and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University, and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a significant concern. At Harvard, the University's decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within 3 years. At the GIC, adverse selection has been contained by subsidizing premiums on a proportional basis and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Voluntary Health Insurance in Europe: Country Experience Sagan A., Thomson S., 2016-07-20 No two markets for voluntary health insurance (VHI) are identical. All differ in some way because they are heavily shaped by the nature and performance of publicly financed health systems and by the contexts in which they have evolved. This volume contains short structured profiles of markets for VHI in 34 countries in Europe. These are drawn from European Union member states plus Armenia Iceland Georgia Norway the Russian Federation Switzerland and Ukraine. The book is aimed at policy-makers and researchers interested in knowing more about how VHI works in practice in a wide range of contexts. Each profile written by one or more local experts identifies gaps in publicly-financed health coverage describes the role VHI plays outlines the way in which the market for VHI operates summarises public policy towards VHI including major developments over time and highlights national debates and challenges. The book is part of a study on VHI in Europe prepared jointly by the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies and the WHO Regional Office for Europe. A companion volume provides an analytical overview of VHI markets across the 34 countries.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Scaling Up Affordable Health Insurance Alexander S. Preker, Marianne E. Lindner, Dov Chernichovsky, Onno P. Schellekens, 2013-05-31 This book presents an in-depth review on the role of health care financing in improving access for low-income populations to needed care, protecting them from the impoverishing effects of illness, and addressing the important issues of social exclusion in government financed programs.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Health Insurance Michael A. Morrisey, 2020 History of Health Insurance in the United States -- The Affordable Care Act -- A Summary of Insurance Coverage -- The Demand for Insurance -- Adverse Selection -- Underwriting and Rate Making -- Risk Adjustment -- Moral Hazard and Prices -- Utilization Management -- Managed Care, Selective Contracting, and the Insurance Industry -- Provider Consolidation, Monopsony Power, and the Managed Care Backlash -- Insurance Market Structure, Conduct, and Performance -- Premium Sensitivity and Health Insurance -- Compensating Differentials -- Taxes and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance -- Employers as Agents -- Health Savings Accounts and Consumer-Directed Health Plans -- The Small-Group Market -- The Individual Insurance Market -- Health Insurance Regulation -- High-Risk Pools -- An Overview of Medicare -- Retiree Coverage -- Medicaid, Crowd-Out, and Long-Term Care Insurance.
  adverse selection and health insurance: The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance John A. Nyman, 2003 Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional income when they become ill.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Coverage Matters Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Care Services, Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, 2001-10-27 Roughly 40 million Americans have no health insurance, private or public, and the number has grown steadily over the past 25 years. Who are these children, women, and men, and why do they lack coverage for essential health care services? How does the system of insurance coverage in the U.S. operate, and where does it fail? The first of six Institute of Medicine reports that will examine in detail the consequences of having a large uninsured population, Coverage Matters: Insurance and Health Care, explores the myths and realities of who is uninsured, identifies social, economic, and policy factors that contribute to the situation, and describes the likelihood faced by members of various population groups of being uninsured. It serves as a guide to a broad range of issues related to the lack of insurance coverage in America and provides background data of use to policy makers and health services researchers.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Medicare Case-mix Index Increase Grace M. Carter, Paul B. Ginsburg, 1986
  adverse selection and health insurance: Health Insurance Handbook Hong Wang, Kimberly Switlick, Christine Ortiz, Beatriz Zurita, Catherine Connor, 2012-01-18 Many countries that subscribe to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have committed to ensuring access to basic health services for their citizens. Health insurance has been considered and promoted as the major financing mechanism to improve access to health services, as well to provide financial risk protection.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Market Structure of the Health Insurance Industry D. Andrew Austin, 2010-04
  adverse selection and health insurance: Global Marketplace for Private Health Insurance Alexander S. Preker, Peter Zweifel, Onno P. Schellekens, 2009-11-18 Financial protection against the cost of illness and inclusion of vulnerable groups will require better mobilization and use of private means. Private voluntary health insurance already plays an important role in mobilizing additional resources to the health sector and protecting against the catastrophic cost of illness in some countries. This review explores the context under which private voluntary health insurance could contribute to an improvement in the sustainability of the health sector and financial protection in other countries.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Handbook of Health Economics Mark V. Pauly, Thomas G. McGuire, Pedro Pita Barros, 2012-01-05 As a relatively new subdiscipline of economics, health economics has made many contributions to areas of the main discipline, such as insurance economics. This volume provides a survey of the burgeoning literature on the subject of health economics. {source : site de l'éditeur].
  adverse selection and health insurance: Managed Competition , 1993-07 Pamphlet from the vertical file.
  adverse selection and health insurance: The Impact of Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries Maria-Luisa Escobar, Charles C. Griffin, R. Paul Shaw, 2011-01-01 Over the past twenty years, many low- and middle-income countries have experimented with health insurance options. While their plans have varied widely in scale and ambition, their goals are the same: to make health services more affordable through the use of public subsidies while also moving care providers partially or fully into competitive markets. Colombia embarked in 1993 on a fifteen-year effort to cover its entire population with insurance, in combination with greater freedom to choose among providers. A decade later Mexico followed suit with a program tailored to its federal system. Several African nations have introduced new programs in the past decade, and many are testing options for reform. For the past twenty years, Eastern Europe has been shifting from government-run care to insurance-based competitive systems, and both China and India have experimental programs to expand coverage. These nations are betting that insurance-based health care financing can increase the accessibility of services, increase providers' productivity, and change the population's health care use patterns, mirroring the development of health systems in most OECD countries. Until now, however, we have known little about the actual effects of these dramatic policy changes. Understanding the impact of health insurance–based care is key to the public policy debate of whether to extend insurance to low-income populations—and if so, how to do it—or to serve them through other means. Using recent household data, this book presents evidence of the impact of insurance programs in China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Indonesia, Namibia, and Peru. The contributors also discuss potential design improvements that could increase impact. They provide innovative insights on improving the evaluation of health insurance reforms and on building a robust knowledge base to guide policy as other countries tackle the health insurance challenge.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Pooling Health Insurance Risks Mark V. Pauly, Bradley Herring, 1999 How are the costs of health insurance premiums determined? Should costs vary according to indicators of risk? How much do premiums vary with risk? Do the healthy subsidize the unhealthy? Should public subsidies vary according to economic status and risk? This book examines these questions.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Disrupting Finance Theo Lynn, John G. Mooney, Pierangelo Rosati, Mark Cummins, 2018-12-06 This open access Pivot demonstrates how a variety of technologies act as innovation catalysts within the banking and financial services sector. Traditional banks and financial services are under increasing competition from global IT companies such as Google, Apple, Amazon and PayPal whilst facing pressure from investors to reduce costs, increase agility and improve customer retention. Technologies such as blockchain, cloud computing, mobile technologies, big data analytics and social media therefore have perhaps more potential in this industry and area of business than any other. This book defines a fintech ecosystem for the 21st century, providing a state-of-the art review of current literature, suggesting avenues for new research and offering perspectives from business, technology and industry.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Risk Adjustment, Risk Sharing and Premium Regulation in Health Insurance Markets Thomas G McGuire, Richard C. Van Kleef, 2018-08-10 Risk Adjustment, Risk Sharing and Premium Regulation in Health Insurance Markets: Theory and Practice describes the goals, design and evaluation of health plan payment systems. Part I contains 5 chapters discussing the role of health plan payment in regulated health insurance markets, key aspects of payment design (i.e. risk adjustment, risk sharing and premium regulation), and evaluation methods using administrative data on medical spending. Part II contains 14 chapters describing the health plan payment system in 14 countries and sectors around the world, including Australia, Belgium, Chile, China, Columbia, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland and the United States. Authors discuss the evolution of these payment schemes, along with ongoing reforms and key lessons on the design of health plan payment.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Health Microinsurance Schemes, 1 International Labour Office, 2007 This two-volume guide provides assitance for a process of monitoring and evaluating the microinsurance schemes. It provides managers a assisting tool during such process for their microinsurance schemes. It also allows stakeholders - both technical and financial - to evaluate the vialability and performance of such schemes.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Hidden Costs, Value Lost Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Care Services, Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, 2003-06-19 Hidden Cost, Value Lost, the fifth of a series of six books on the consequences of uninsurance in the United States, illustrates some of the economic and social losses to the country of maintaining so many people without health insurance. The book explores the potential economic and societal benefits that could be realized if everyone had health insurance on a continuous basis, as people over age 65 currently do with Medicare. Hidden Costs, Value Lost concludes that the estimated benefits across society in health years of life gained by providing the uninsured with the kind and amount of health services that the insured use, are likely greater than the additional social costs of doing so. The potential economic value to be gained in better health outcomes from uninterrupted coverage for all Americans is estimated to be between $65 and $130 billion each year.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Risk, Information and Insurance Henri Loubergé, 1990-01-31 Orio Giarini The Geneva Association (International Association for the Study of Risk and Insurance Economics) was founded in 1973. The main goal was to stimulate and organize objective research in the field of risk, uncertainty, and insurance, in a world in which such issues were clearly becoming of greater and greater relevance for all economic actors. This was a pioneer ing effort, especially as economic theory and the teaching of economics were still anchored to the key notion of general equilibrium under an assumption of certainty. Thus, we had to start our work almost from scratch. One of the first initiatives was to bring together in Geneva, in June of 1973, all the academics in Europe already involved in risk and insurance economics. We found eight from five different countries who never had met before. This seminar chaired by Raymond Barre, the first president of The Geneva Association, was the first of an annual series that became known as the seminar of The European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists. Since then more than 100 economists from most European countries as well as participants from two other continents and in particular from the United States have taken part in this seminar.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging John Piggott, Alan Woodland, 2016-11-21 Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging synthesizes the economic literature on aging and the subjects associated with it, including social insurance and healthcare costs, both of which are of interest to policymakers and academics. These volumes, the first of a new subseries in the Handbooks in Economics, describe and analyze scholarship created since the inception of serious attention began in the late 1970s, including information from general economics journals, from various field journals in economics, especially, but not exclusively, those covering labor markets and human resource issues, from interdisciplinary social science and life science journals, and from papers by economists published in journals associated with gerontology, history, sociology, political science, and demography, amongst others. - Dissolves the barriers between policymakers and scholars by presenting comprehensive portraits of social and theoretical issues - Synthesizes valuable data on the topic from a variety of journals dating back to the late 1970s in a convenient, comprehensive resource - Presents diverse perspectives on subjects that can be closely associated with national and regional concerns - Offers comprehensive, critical reviews and expositions of the essential aspects of the economics of population aging
  adverse selection and health insurance: The Affordable Care Act Tamara Thompson, 2014-12-02 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was designed to increase health insurance quality and affordability, lower the uninsured rate by expanding insurance coverage, and reduce the costs of healthcare overall. Along with sweeping change came sweeping criticisms and issues. This book explores the pros and cons of the Affordable Care Act, and explains who benefits from the ACA. Readers will learn how the economy is affected by the ACA, and the impact of the ACA rollout.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Handbook of Insurance Georges Dionne, 2013-12-02 This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Foundations of Insurance Economics Georges Dionne, Scott E. Harrington, 1992 Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.
  adverse selection and health insurance: A Course in Public Economics John Leach, 2004 This 2004 textbook explores how markets operate and governments' roles in addressing market failures.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Understanding the Well-Being of LGBTQI+ Populations National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Committee on Population, Committee on Understanding the Well-Being of Sexual and Gender Diverse Populations, 2021-01-23 The increase in prevalence and visibility of sexually gender diverse (SGD) populations illuminates the need for greater understanding of the ways in which current laws, systems, and programs affect their well-being. Individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, asexual, transgender, non-binary, queer, or intersex, as well as those who express same-sex or -gender attractions or behaviors, will have experiences across their life course that differ from those of cisgender and heterosexual individuals. Characteristics such as age, race and ethnicity, and geographic location intersect to play a distinct role in the challenges and opportunities SGD people face. Understanding the Well-Being of LGBTQI+ Populations reviews the available evidence and identifies future research needs related to the well-being of SDG populations across the life course. This report focuses on eight domains of well-being; the effects of various laws and the legal system on SGD populations; the effects of various public policies and structural stigma; community and civic engagement; families and social relationships; education, including school climate and level of attainment; economic experiences (e.g., employment, compensation, and housing); physical and mental health; and health care access and gender-affirming interventions. The recommendations of Understanding the Well-Being of LGBTQI+ Populations aim to identify opportunities to advance understanding of how individuals experience sexuality and gender and how sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex status affect SGD people over the life course.
  adverse selection and health insurance: "Expanding Consumer Choice and Addressing 'adverse Selection' Concerns in Health Insurance" United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, 2005
  adverse selection and health insurance: America's Children Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Institute of Medicine, Committee on Children, Health Insurance, and Access to Care, 1998-11-27 America's Children is a comprehensive, easy-to-read analysis of the relationship between health insurance and access to care. The book addresses three broad questions: How is children's health care currently financed? Does insurance equal access to care? How should the nation address the health needs of this vulnerable population? America's Children explores the changing role of Medicaid under managed care; state-initiated and private sector children's insurance programs; specific effects of insurance status on the care children receive; and the impact of chronic medical conditions and special health care needs. It also examines the status of safety net health providers, including community health centers, children's hospitals, school-based health centers, and others and reviews the changing patterns of coverage and tax policy options to increase coverage of private-sector, employer-based health insurance. In response to growing public concerns about uninsured children, last year Congress voted to provide $24 billion over five years for new state insurance initiatives. This volume will serve as a primer for concerned federal policymakers and regulators, state agency officials, health plan decisionmakers, health care providers, children's health advocates, and researchers.
  adverse selection and health insurance: Social Health Insurance for Developing Nations William C. Hsiao, R. Paul Shaw, Andrew Fraker, World Bank, 2007 Specialist groups have often advised health ministers and other decision makers in developing countries on the use of social health insurance (SHI) as a way of mobilizing revenue for health, reforming health sector performance, and providing universal coverage. This book reviews the specific design and implementation challenges facing SHI in low- and middle-income countries and presents case studies on Ghana, Kenya, Philippines, Colombia, and Thailand.
  adverse selection and health insurance: COMPETITIVE FAILURES IN INSURANCE MARKETS. PIERRE-ANDRE. CHIAPPORI, 2006
  adverse selection and health insurance: Intermediate Microeconomics Patrick M. Emerson, 2019
  adverse selection and health insurance: China's Healthcare System and Reform Lawton Robert Burns, Gordon G. Liu, 2017-01-26 This volume provides a comprehensive review of China's healthcare system and policy reforms in the context of the global economy. Following a value-chain framework, the 16 chapters cover the payers, the providers, and the producers (manufacturers) in China's system. It also provides a detailed analysis of the historical development of China's healthcare system, the current state of its broad reforms, and the uneasy balance between China's market-driven approach and governmental regulation. Most importantly, it devotes considerable attention to the major problems confronting China, including chronic illness, public health, and long-term care and economic security for the elderly. Burns and Liu have assembled the latest research from leading health economists and political scientists, as well as senior public health officials and corporate executives, making this book an essential read for industry professionals, policymakers, researchers, and students studying comparative health systems across the world.
  adverse selection and health insurance: The Managed Health Care Handbook Peter Reid Kongstvedt, 1996 Considered the 'bible' of the managed care industry, this third edition is greatly expanded with 30 new chapters and extensively updated-- double the size of the last edition! the Managed Health Care Handbook is a key strategic and operational resource for use in planning and decision-making. it includes first-hand advice from experienced managers on how to succeed in every aspect of managed care: quality management, claims and benefits administration, managing patient demand, As well as risk management, subacute care, physician compensation and much more! This seminal resource is a must for providers, purchasers, and payersfor everyone involved in the managed care industry.